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Abstract
Based on a combined register database for Norwegian and Swedish unemployment spells, 
we use the ‘between-countries-variation’ in the unemployment insurance systems to iden-
tify causal effects. The elasticity of the job hazard rate with respect to the benefit re-
placement ratio is around -1.0 in Norway and -0.5 in Sweden. The limited benefit dura-
tion period in Sweden has a large positive impact on the hazard rate, despite generous 
renewal options through participation in labour market programs. Compulsory program 
participation seems to operate as a ‘stick’, rather than a ‘carrot’, and is therefore an effi-
cient tool for counteracting moral hazard problems in the benefit system.  
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21 Introduction 
The question of how economic incentives embedded in the unemployment compensation 
system affect transitions out of unemployment has received considerable attention in the 
literature. Surveys are provided by Danziger et al (1981), Devine and Kiefer (1991), At-
kinson and Micklewright (1991), Layard et al (1991), and more recently by Holmlund 
(1998) and Pedersen and Westergård-Nielsen (1998). While the theoretical literature 
(Mortensen, 1977; 1990; van den Berg, 1990b) clearly predicts that a higher level of un-
employment insurance (UI) benefits reduces the transition rate from unemployment to 
employment (at least for newly unemployed benefit claimants), the lessons arising from 
the empirical literature are more mixed. Empirical results for the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Lancaster, 1979; Moffitt, 1985; Narendranathan et al, 1985; Katz and 
Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1990) tends rather unanimously to favour significant effects associ-
ated with the UI benefit level. And the conclusion reached by Lancaster (1979, p. 956) 
more than 20 years ago that an elasticity of the escape rate from unemployment with re-
spect to the benefit level in the order of -0.6 could be regarded as ‘established beyond 
reasonable doubt’, still seems rather representative. Evidence from central parts of 
Europe (Hujer and Schneider, 1989; Groot, 1990; van den Berg, 1990a; Steiner, 1990; 
Wurzel, 1990; Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1993; Hunt, 1995; van den Berg et al, 1998) is 
more ambiguous, and significant benefit level effects are often hard to establish at all. 
There has been a number of Scandinavian contributions to the literature in recent years; 
all of them emanating from the fast growing supply of register based data sets (Jensen 
and Westergård-Nielsen, 1990; Hernæs and Strøm, 1996; Carling et al, 1996; Carling et 
al, 2001; Røed and Zhang, 2003). They tend to support the Anglo-American finding of a 
3significant disincentive effect associated with the UI benefit level, although the size of 
the effect is far from established.   
There are doubts regarding the validity of all these results, however. The empiri-
cal problem is that there is virtually no truly independent variation in individual UI bene-
fit entitlements that can be used to identify causal effects. Variations in UI benefits, as 
well as in replacement ratios, are typically strongly correlated to variations in previous 
income, which again are correlated to unobserved characteristics that themselves affect 
the escape rate from unemployment. One approach that has been adopted by researchers 
in the United States is to take advantage of institutional differences between states 
(Moffitt, 1985; Katz and Meyer, 1990). Katz and Meyer (1990), for example, use the UI 
benefit and the previous income as explanatory variables in a hazard rate model, and then 
rely on differences in the functional non-linear relationship between income and benefits 
across states to identify the causal effect of interest. Potential differences in hazard rates 
between states that are not related to the UI benefit system are controlled for by means of 
state dummy variables. The main problem with this approach is that the identification of 
causality rests on an unjustified and rather restrictive (log) linearity assumption regarding 
the ‘effect’ of previous (or expected) income. If the income affects the hazard rate in a 
non-linear fashion (either through direct causality or through linkages to unobserved 
characteristics), any non-linear function of previous income may pick this effect up, in-
cluding the UI benefit level. Hence, the estimated effect of UI benefits may still be spuri-
ous. Moreover, there may be differences in the hazard rate pattern across states that are 
not fully accounted for by dummy variables. Another approach that has been used by 
some researchers to solve the problem of spurious correlation is to take advantage of 
4structural reforms (e.g. changes in the compensation level) that affect some, but not all 
unemployed persons, and apply the difference-in-difference methodology (Meyer, 1989; 
Hunt, 1995; Winter-Ebmer, 1998; Carling et al, 2001). This approach may also be prob-
lematic, however, as it rests on the often questionable assumption that labour market op-
portunities do not develop differently for the ‘treatment’ and the ‘control’ groups. Røed 
and Zhang (2003) take advantage of some particularities of the Norwegian UI benefit 
system that produce an element of random (from the individuals’ viewpoint) variation in 
replacement ratios. They find strong disincentive effects, with benefit elasticities around 
–0.7 on average. But ‘randomised’ variation in benefits is indeed a rarity; hence the gen-
erality and significance of these results remains to be verified. 
Scandinavian policy makers have long realised that their rather generous income 
support systems may entail a moral hazard problem. But, rather than lowering the level of 
benefits, the main strategy has been to accompany the income support measures with 
‘carrots and sticks’ aimed at counteracting the disincentive effects. This policy has in par-
ticular been associated with strict eligibility criteria regarding willingness to accept avail-
able work (OECD, 2000) and limited duration of benefits. But, although the literature is 
more unanimous in terms of identifying significant effects of benefit exhaustion and 
sanctions (Meyer, 1990; Hunt, 1995; Carling et al, 1996; Winter-Ebmer, 1998; Thoursie, 
1998; Bratberg and Vaage, 2000; Card and Levine, 2000; Røed and Zhang, 2003), there 
are again methodological difficulties that cast doubt on the results. First, the transition 
rate may change over spell duration for a number of reasons, such as discouragement, 
depreciation of human capital, statistical discrimination, information gathering etc.; hence 
it is difficult to isolate the effect of benefit exhaustion. Second, the concepts of ‘limited 
5benefit duration’ and ‘sanctions’ mean different things in different countries. While for 
example the US version of these concepts truly implies economic hardship for the people 
concerned, the Scandinavian versions basically imply that benefits are replaced by pro-
gram participation income or by means tested cash transfers. This suggests that empirical 
results regarding threats of benefit termination are not easily transferable across different 
countries.
The aim of the present paper is to use the variation in incentive-structures be-
tween unemployed persons in Norway and Sweden in order to identify causal effects of 
the benefit system on the job transition rates. The basic idea  is to identify the effect of UI 
benefits by ‘purifying’ the variation that occurs solely because people happen to live in 
countries with different UI institutions. Norway and Sweden are in many respects ex-
tremely similar: They were united until 1905, they are culturally more or less indistin-
guishable, they have (almost) the same language and they have since 1954 adhered to a 
common Nordic labour market. They have both very high labour market participation 
rates, particularly among women. They share many of the same institutions, with rela-
tively large welfare states, highly regulated labour markets and relatively co-ordinated 
wage setting. However, their UI benefit systems differ quite sharply in two respects: The 
profile of replacement ratios and the maximum duration of benefit eligibility. Although 
the replacement ratio declines with income in both countries, the exact functional rela-
tionship differs. While the Swedish system provides the highest replacement ratios for 
low-income workers, the Norwegian system is the most generous for high-income work-
ers. Hence, to the extent that the replacement ratio is an important determinant of the 
transition rate from unemployment to employment, one would expect to find that the ratio 
6of the transition rates for low- to high-income workers is lower in Sweden than in Nor-
way. There are also substantial differences in the maximum duration by which benefits 
can be maintained without ‘activity’ requirements. While benefits can be obtained for 
156 weeks in Norway they are limited to 60 weeks in Sweden. To the extent that these 
constraints affect behaviour, one would expect to find traces of the different systems in 
the pattern of job transition rates, e.g. in the form of rising hazard rates in the period just 
prior to benefit exhaustion.
In the present paper, we provide compelling evidence that the institutional differ-
ences between the Norwegian and the Swedish UI benefit regimes indeed have the pre-
dicted consequences referred to above. The two different systems are clearly mirrored in 
the data in a way that convincingly establishes the link between economic incentives and 
job search behaviour. The paper proceeds as follows: The next section describes our data, 
with emphasis on the structural differences between the two countries. Section 3 presents 
the econometric model that we use to extract the causal parameters of interest. Section 4 
presents the main results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Data 
We have gathered complete register data for unemployment spells in Norway and Swe-
den during 1999 and 2000. From these databases, we have selected entrants into ordinary 
full-time unemployment aged 25-54 who were eligible for UI benefits (and who would 
have been so in both countries) and who were employed prior to the unemployment spell. 
Their subsequent unemployment status was then observed by the end of each calendar 
month during the two-year data period. For each person, we have information about pre-
vious income, UI benefits, age, gender, educational attainment, job practice, nationality 
7and region. Despite the differences in registration routines between the two countries, we 
consider the Norwegian and Swedish data to be highly comparable. Descriptive statistics 
are provided in Table 1. In total, there are around 1.2 million monthly observations di-
vided into 327,000 spells shared between 250,000 individuals. Swedish spells were on 
average much shorter than Norwegian spells. On the other hand, while two thirds of the 
completed Norwegian spells ended directly in a transition to employment
1
, this was the 
case for only 42 per cent of the Swedish spells. As much as 35 per cent of the completed 
Swedish spells ended in a transition to a labour market program, while this was the case 
for only 17 per cent of the Norwegian spells. Hence, it seems that Swedish labour market 
policy is the most active, in the sense that the job seekers are spurred into some kind of 
activity if a job is not obtained fairly quickly. The average monthly transition rate from 
unemployment to employment was around 11 per cent in Sweden and 10 per cent in 
Norway. It may also be noted that the ratio of job transition rates for the lowest versus the 
highest decile in the country specific wage distribution is much lower in Sweden (0.69) 
than in Norway (0.92). This is a first rough indication that the differences in the replace-
ment ratio profiles between the two countries do have the expected effects on the relative 
exit rates. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Norway Sweden
Number of individuals 31,151 218,545
Number of spells 35,969 291,229
Number of monthly observations 188,406 1,080,040
1 We are not able to identify the entry into jobs directly for both countries; hence we assume that per-
sons who leave the unemployment register completely have obtained jobs. Given that we focus on a group 
of persons with strong pecuniary incentives to register in the absence of a job transition, we consider this 
assumption to be reasonable. 
8Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Norway Sweden
Outcome of spells (per cent) 
Transition to a job (out of the register) 48.74 37.05
Transition to a labour market program 13.09 31.32
Other transition  (loss of benefits or disability) 14.36 19.87 
Censored at the end of the observation window 23.81 11.76
Average monthly transition probability to a job (per cent) 9.86 11.10 
Transition to a job for the poorest decile relative to the richest 
decile  
0.92 0.69
Fraction women (per cent of individuals) 44.37 46.39
Age (average taken over individuals) 36.33 36.00
Educational attainment (per cent of individuals) 
Only compulsory school 23.36 21.56
Incomplete secondary school 17.21 6.83
Completed secondary school 39.16 54.77
1-3 year College/University 15.95 10.09
More than 3 year College/University 4.32 6.76
Citizenship (per cent of individuals) 
National 90.76 91.62
Other Nordic 1.44 2.24
Other OECD 3.56 3.01
Non-OECD 4.24 3.13
Figure 1 describes the distribution of replacement ratios and previous (daily) in-
comes in the two countries. The difference in replacement ratio profiles is illustrated in 
panel (a). It is clearly seen that Sweden has higher replacement ratios than Norway for 
low incomes and lower replacement ratios for high incomes (with incomes measured in a 
common currency). However, panel (b) indicates that there is also a more equal distribu-
tion in previous incomes among unemployed persons in Sweden than in Norway and that 
the income level is also somewhat higher in Norway. As a result, it can be seen from 
panel (c) that the replacement ratio is higher in Sweden than in Norway at virtually all 
percentiles of each country’s income distribution. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of previous income and replacement ratios in Norway and Sweden, 
based on the lower bounds of the percentiles in each country’s income distribution 
While benefits can be maintained almost indefinitely in Norway (156 weeks, in 
many cases followed by a somewhat smaller cash-transfer), the Swedish benefit period is 
limited to 60 weeks. Until 2001 (i.e. during the whole period covered by our data), bene-
fit entitlements in Sweden could be renewed through participation in labour market pro-
grams. It is important to bear in mind that in both countries, the duration constraint is a 
very ‘soft’ one, in the sense that paid labour market programs and/or means tested Social 
Security benefits are available for persons without benefit entitlements. However, some
form of ‘activation’ is usually required when the benefit entitlements are exhausted. 
The period covered by our data was a period of sturdy labour demand in both 
countries, and in Sweden it was also a period of strong recovery. The standardised unem-
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ployment rates in 1999 and 2000 were 3.2 and 3.5 per cent in Norway, and 7.2 and 5.9 
per cent in Sweden. 
3 Econometric Approach
The analysis in this paper focuses particularly on two aspects of the benefit systems, the 
replacement ratio and benefit exhaustion. The basic idea is to take advantage of the be-
tween-countries variation in these institutional factors in order to eliminate bias in causal 
parameters arising from correlation between the variables of interest and unobserved in-
dividual characteristics. Hence, we identify the effect of the replacement ratio through the 
variation in replacement ratios between individuals with similar incomes, but with differ-
ent replacement ratios because they happen to live in countries with different rules. The 
spurious part, reflecting that persons with different incomes also may have different un-
observed characteristics, is eliminated through the inclusion of both countries’ hypotheti-
cally calculated replacement ratios as explanatory variables. In this paper, we choose to 
represent the UI benefit in the form of a (log) replacement ratio. This implies that it is 
only the ratio between benefits and the expected wage that affects behaviour, and not 
their respective levels. This greatly facilitates compatibility between the two countries, 
but the underlying homogeneity assumption is also in line with influential theoretical 
predictions arising from dynamic search theory (see e.g. Mortensen, 1990, pp 68-69). 
The expected wage is assumed to equal the previously observed wage.
Let T be the hazard rate by which individual i transits to employment at cal-
endar time t, when spell duration is d. As we observe labour market status by the end of 
each month, we set up the model in terms of discrete (grouped) hazard rates. Let 
 ,i t d 
ti be the 
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calendar time at which individual i entered the state of unemployment. The grouped haz-
ard, i.e. the probability of exiting during duration month d, given that no exit occurred 
before that, is given as 
1
1 exp ( , )
d
id i i
d
h tT

§ ·
   ¨
© ¹
³ u u du ¸

.    (1) 
Assume that the hazard rate is proportional in factors depending on observed covariates, 
unobserved covariates, calendar-time and process-time (spell duration). Assume also for 
simplicity that time-varying covariates only vary between (and not within) observation 
months, and that spell duration effects are constant within each month. These assump-
tions imply that we can write the integrated hazard rate in (1) in terms of integrals taken 
over the calendar-month component only, multiplied by factors of proportionality reflect-
ing spell duration and effects of observed- and unobserved heterogeneity, respectively. 
Let xit be a vector of individual control variables, such as age, gender, educational attain-
ment etc., and let ri be the log of the replacement ratio applying for individual i. Further-
more, let ıjt and be measures of the calendar time- and spell duration effects respec-
tively, in each country j.  Imposing exponential link functions between individual charac-
teristics and the hazard rates, we then have that the probability that a person i exits unem-
ployment during calendar month t, when the spell duration is d months is given as: 
jdO
  ( , , , ) 1 exp exp ,itd it i it j j i jt jd ih h t d x v x r vE N V O       (2)
where vi is a scalar measure of unobserved heterogeneity. Note that the calendar time ef-
fects are not restricted to remain constant within each month, and that V is the (log of 
the) integral taken over the calendar time component corresponding to the month in ques-
tion. Indeed, it is likely that the transition rates vary substantially over the calendar 
jt
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month, e.g. with much higher transition rates on Mondays than on other weekdays. With
suitable trading day- and seasonal adjustments, the V can be given a business-cycle in-
terpretation (Røed, 2001). The parameters of interest in the present paper are the N ,
i.e. the elasticities of the hazard rates with respect to the replacement ratio, and the O ’s,
i.e. the spell duration effects. The problem with identifying these parameters is that both 
the replacement ratios and the spell durations are likely to be highly correlated to unob-
served heterogeneity.
jt
,iH
'j s
jd
Consider first the scope for identifying the replacement ratio effects. The correla-
tion between replacement ratios and unobserved heterogeneity arises because replace-
ment ratios depend on previous income, whereas previous income (conditioned on other 
explanatory variables) is likely to be correlated to unobserved characteristics such as mo-
tivation and working spirit (represented by the term vi). A direct estimation of (2) in dis-
regard of unobserved heterogeneity thus produces a coefficient attached to the replace-
ment ratio that is a mixture of the causal effect embedded in the parameter N  and the 
correlation between the replacement ratio and the unobserved covariate vi. In order to re-
move this source of bias, we assume that the correlation structure between the replace-
ment ratios calculated according to the different country-specific rules and unobserved 
heterogeneity is common across the two countries, i.e.
j
1 2i iN iSv r rD D     .                                                 (3) 
where riN is the replacement ratio applying for individual i if that individual register in 
Norway, and riS is the ratio applying if registering in Sweden. Hence, a consistent esti-
mate of N  can be obtained by including both hypothetical replacement ratios as explana-j
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tory variables for the transition rates, and assuming that they have the same ‘effect’ in 
both countries. The intuition is that while the replacement ratio calculated according to 
one country’s specific rules can have causal effects only in that particular country, its 
spurious effects applies to the other country as well. The hypothetical replacement ratios 
are calculated on the basis of the unemployed workers position in the distribution of pre-
vious incomes among the unemployed (see Figure 1, panel c). For example, a Swedish 
unemployed person with a previous income that places him in the p’th decile in the in-
come distribution among the Swedish unemployed, is equipped with a hypothetical Nor-
wegian replacement ratio equal to that faced by a Norwegian unemployed belonging to 
the p’th decile in the Norwegian income distribution. Inserting (3) in (2) yields 
  1 2( , , , ) 1 exp expitd it i it j j i jt jd iN iS ih h t d x x r r rH E N V O D D         H , (4)
whereH  is now orthogonal to ri.i
Consider then the identification of the spell duration effects, embedded in O . A 
common problem in duration analysis is that the duration patterns arising from unob-
served heterogeneity and structural duration dependence are indistinguishable from data 
alone. There are two potential sources of non-parametric identification. The first is re-
peated spells by the same individuals (see van den Berg, 2001). But this source of identi-
fication requires that there is no dependence across spells apart from that arising from the 
person-specific ‘fixed effect’  (or that this dependence is known). This is a questionable 
assumption insofar as there are positive or negative duration effects within each spell, 
particularly if the spells are close in time (an apparently new spell may in some senses be 
a continuation of the previous one). Moreover, the actual usage of this source of identifi-
cation may in our case introduce more serious selection problems than it solves, since the 
jd
iH
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probability of having more than one spell during a given two year period obviously is 
strongly correlated to the length of the first spell. The second source of identification 
builds on variation in lagged explanatory variables. Its basic idea is that the conditional 
expectation of unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. conditioned on observed characteristics and 
spell duration) depends on exit rates experienced earlier in the (same) spell, while true 
duration dependence does not (van den Berg and van Ours, 1994; 1996). The higher the 
exit rates have been earlier in a spell, the more selection has taken place at any given du-
ration, and the lower is the expected value of the unobserved covariate İi. In the present 
context, the existence of multiple cohorts ensures that persons with exactly the same spell 
durations have been subject to different labour market conditions earlier in the spell, and 
hence have been exposed to different selection forces. This variation in lagged explana-
tory variables is substantial and makes it possible to identify the underlying structural du-
ration dependence based on the information content in the data alone, i.e. without any 
arbitrary parametric assumptions at all. Identification is obtained even without the as-
sumption of a Mixed Proportional Hazard model (Brinch, 2000).  
In order to avoid unnecessary parametric restrictions, we assume that the unob-
served variables İi is discretely distributed (Lindsay, 1983), with the number of mass-
points chosen by adding points until it is no longer possible to increase the likelihood 
function (Heckman and Singer, 1984). The formulation of the likelihood function de-
pends on the sources used for identification of unobserved heterogeneity. When both 
sources are used (repeated spells and lagged explanatory variables), unobserved charac-
teristics are assumed fixed at the individual level across different spells. Let Bi be the 
number of spells experienced by individual i during the whole observation period. Each
15
spell either ends in a transition, or it is censored. Censoring occurs when persons exit to 
labour market programs, when benefits are terminated, and at the end of the observation 
period. Let yib=1 if spell number b of individual i ends in a transition (non-censored), and 
zero otherwise, let dib be the duration of that spell. Let W be the number of mass points in 
the distribution of unobservables and let pw be the probability that the unobserved covari-
ate obtains the value İw. The likelihood function in terms of observations of (dib, yib, t, xit)
is then given as 
   
1
11 1
( , , , ) 1 ( , , , ) , 1,
i ibI
ij
ib
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y
I w ib it w ib it s w w
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where  is the number of individuals in the dataset. The likelihood (5) is maximised
with respect to the model parameters in (4) and with respect to the parameters entering 
the discrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (W,pw,İw). When only the second 
source of identification (lagged explanatory variables) is trusted, each spell in the dataset 
is treated as a different individual (hence  for all ‘individuals’), and the likelihood 
function in terms of observations of (di, yi, t, xit) becomes
IN
1iB  
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where  is the number of spells in the dataset and i is the identifier of spells, 
rather than individuals. 
SN ( )S IN N!
Estimates based on (6) are consistent either the fixed-effect-across-spells assumption
holds or not, but they are not efficient when it holds. Hence, we can use a Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978) to confront the fixed-effect-across-spells assumption embedded in (5) 
with data.
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4 Results 
The model was estimated both with and without the fixed-effect-across-spells assump-
tion. In the former case (equation 5), the model was ‘saturated’ with seven points of sup-
port in the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, while in the latter case (equation 6), it 
was sufficient with three points. The two models produced similar results with respect to 
replacement ratio elasticities and effects of benefit exhaustion (i.e. the changes in the 
baseline in the months just prior to exhaustion). However, the rest of the estimated dura-
tion baseline differed quite sharply, with strong positive duration dependence in both 
countries implied by the fixed-effect-across-spells model, and no systematic, or even 
negative duration dependence implied by the least restrictive model. The Hausman test 
strongly rejected the fixed-effect-across-spells assumption
2
. Hence, we conclude that the 
data confirmed our suspicions regarding the reliance on repeated spells to identify spell 
duration effects. We therefore focus on the results from the least restrictive model (equa-
tion 6), even though it does not take advantage of all available information (i.e. that some
persons are observed having more than one spell), and hence cannot be fully efficient.
The estimates regarding benefit effects and most individual characteristics are 
presented in Table 2, while the estimates regarding age and the spell duration baselines 
are presented in Figures 2 and 3, respectively (we use a graphic presentation of these re-
)
2 The Hausman test is a parametric test; hence we conditioned on the number of mass-points in the
heterogeneity distribution. The test was performed in the following way: Let b1 be the vector of common
parameter estimates from the model without the fixed-effect-across-spells assumption (equation 6), let b2 be 
the same estimates from the model based on the fixed-effect-across-spells assumption (equation 5, with the
same number of mass-points), and let V1 and V2 be the associated covariance matrixes. The Hausman test 
statistic was then calculated as and under the null hypothesis that the
fixed-effect-across-spells assumption holds this statistic is chi-square distributed with the degrees of free-
dom corresponding to the number of common parameters. With three mass-points in each model, we ob-
tained a Chi-Square Statistic (with 215 degrees of freedom) of around 1 million.
1
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) '( ) (H b b V V b b
   
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sults due to the large number of parameters). A point to note is that most of the control 
variables have very similar effects in Norway and Sweden. For example, the effects asso-
ciated with educational attainment (reported in Table 2) and age (reported in Figure 2) are 
hardly distinguishable. We interpret this as supporting evidence regarding the compara-
bility of the data, as well as regarding the assumption that heterogeneity affects the Nor-
wegian and Swedish hazard rates in a similar fashion. On the other hand, there are huge 
differences in the spell duration pattern and in the replacement ratio elasticities.  
Table 2 
Selected Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Norway Sweden
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Replacement ratio (causal effect) -1.07** 0.15 -0.47** 0.09
Being a woman -0.07** -0.02 -0.16** 0.01
Educational attainment 
Only compulsory school 0 ref. 0 ref.
Incomplete secondary school 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Completed secondary school 0.08** 0.02 0.07** 0.01
1-3 year College/University 0.20** 0.03 0.19** 0.01
More than 3 year College/University 0.27** 0.04 0.26** 0.01
Relevant education (with respect to wanted job type) 0.09** 0.02 0.23** 0.01
Relevant practice (with respect to wanted job type) 0.17** 0.02 0.18** 0.01
Citizenship 
National (Norwegian/Swedish) 0 ref. 0 ref.
Other Nordic 0.22** 0.06 -0.02 0.02
Other European -0.15** 0.04 -0.20** 0.02
Asian (including Turkish) -0.25** 0.09 -0.44** 0.03
African -0.26** 0.05 -0.37** 0.05
Latin American -0.01 0.12 -0.24** 0.06
North American or Oceanic   -0.24 0.17 -0.22** 0.06
Common Parameters 
Estimate SE
Norwegian replacement ratio (spurious effect) 1.44** 0.06
Swedish replacement ratio (spurious effect) -0.75** 0.09
Mass points in distribution of unobserved variables 3 points (variance of H=0.02)
Number of parameters 220
Log-likelihood -364670.97
*(**) significant at the level of 5(1) per cent. 
Note: In addition to the variables reported in the table and in figures, calendar month– and region (‘fylke’ 
in Norway, ‘län’ in Sweden) dummies were included for both countries. 
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Figure 2. Estimated effects of age in Norway and Sweden (with 95 per cent point-wise 
confidence intervals). 
Consider first the estimates of structural duration dependence depicted in Figure 
3. While there is a relatively strong pattern of negative duration dependence in Norway, 
the hazard rate in Sweden does not display any clear duration pattern
3
. It rises slightly 
during the first six months, and then declines during the next six months. The most con-
spicuous feature of the Swedish spell duration baseline, however, is that it rises by around 
3 To check out the robustness of the results, we have also estimated the spell duration baselines in
completely separate models for the two countries (i.e. without the assumption of a common unobserved
heterogeneity distribution). For Sweden, this hardly changed the results at all, while for Norway, the base-
line exhibited slightly less negative duration dependence (with positive duration dependence during the first 
two months).
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50 per cent in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion
4
. This corresponds almost ex-
actly to the exhaustion effect reported by Røed and Zhang (2003) regarding the previous 
80-week benefit limit in Norway that applied until 1997. Hence, it seems that the limited 
benefit period in Sweden has a substantial effect on search behaviour, and that this was 
the case even when benefit entitlements could be renewed through participation in labour 
market programs. Previous Swedish studies (Carling et al, 1996; Thoursie, 1998) have 
failed to establish this effect in a convincing way, due to large standard errors in the esti-
mated spell duration baselines (because of relatively small risk sets with long durations). 
It is interesting to note, however, that the point estimates of the exhaustion effect reported 
by both Carling et al (1996) and Thoursie (1998) are not far from our own (very precise) 
estimates. The substantial and significant rise in the job hazard during the months just 
prior to benefit exhaustion establishes beyond doubt that even the very ‘soft’ benefit du-
ration limit operating in Sweden, affect search behaviour in the intended way. The pros-
pect of being enrolled into a labour market program does apparently not have the per-
verse effect often identified in search models (see e.g. Carling et al, 1996) of raising res-
ervation wages and lowering search effort. On the contrary, program enrolment seems to 
be considered a ‘stick’ rather than a ‘carrot’ by many unemployed workers. One obvious 
explanation is that program participation reduces the quantity of leisure. Our results at 
this point are in accordance with experimental evidence reported by Black et al (2002) 
4 We also estimated the model for Sweden with only positively identified job transitions recorded as 
true transitions (i.e. we censored observations ending with ‘lost contact’). This did not change the results to 
any large extent, although the estimated rise in the hazard rate in the months just prior to exhaustion was 
reduced to around 45 per cent. Note that the large confidence intervals after month 14 in the Swedish base-
line simply reflects that most of the remaining persons who do not obtain a job transit to labour market pro-
grams at this stage of the spell, hence very few are left in the population at risk. 
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indicating that the ‘threat’ of (mandatory) employment and training services has a much
stronger effect on employment transitions than actual participation.
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Figure 3. Estimated structural duration dependence in Norway and Sweden (with 95 per 
cent point-wise confidence intervals) 
The strong exhaustion effect may not only reflect the prospect of having to partici-
pate in labour market programs. An additional explanation is that persons with immi-
nently expiring benefits are given high priority in the allocation of labour market ser-
vices. Prior to benefit exhaustion the job seekers are typically summoned to consultations 
at the Public Employment Service in order to discuss employment opportunities, job 
search efforts, alternative possibilities of income support etc. Dolton and O’Neill (1996) 
and Gorter and Kalb (1996) report evidence indicating that just by giving attention to un-
employed workers (e.g. by summoning them to an interview) employment offices stimu-
late them to find a job more quickly.
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The effects associated with a marginal change in the replacement ratio are also 
stronger in Norway than in Sweden. The Norwegian elasticity estimate around –1.0 indi-
cates slightly stronger responses than previous results reported for Norway by Røed and 
Zhang (2003), while the Swedish elasticity estimate of –0.5 indicates weaker responses 
than previously reported for Sweden by Carling et al (2001). A weaker Swedish disincen-
tive effect could result from a more active Public Employment Service, leaving less room 
for individuals to optimise freely with respect to their own reservation wage and search 
intensity. It should be noted in passing that the two hypothetical replacement ratios, 
which by construction have no causal effect on the hazard rates, are attributed coeffi-
cients that are larger (in absolute terms) than the true causal effects (see the bottom of 
Table 2). This suggests that the failure to control for spurious correlation between re-
placement ratios and transition rates is likely to produce misleading results
5
.
5 Conclusion 
The institutional set-up of the unemployment insurance system may have a substantial 
influence on the escape rate from unemployment. In the present paper, we have combined 
register data from Norway and Sweden to identify causal effects associated with the re-
placement ratio and the maximum benefit duration. We find that structural differences 
between the two countries are clearly mirrored in the transition rate pattern from unem-
ployment into jobs. While the relatively long maximum benefit duration in Norway (3 
years) produces a pattern of monotonously declining employment prospects over spell 
5 In our case, it turns out that unobserved heterogeneity tends to bias the elasticities towards zero, par-
ticularly for Norway. Without the controls for spurious correlation (i.e. with separate estimations for each 
country), we obtain elasticity estimates of  -0.49 (0.09) in Norway and –0.43 (0.02) in Sweden (standard 
errors in parentheses). 
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duration, the short maximum benefit eligibility period in Sweden (60 weeks) delivers a 
relatively stable hazard rate, with a sharp increase in the months just prior to benefit ex-
haustion. This may be viewed as a surprising result, given that benefit entitlements in 
Sweden could easily be renewed through participation in labour market programs during 
the observation period. A corollary seems to be that the ‘threat’ of compulsory program 
participation (or otherwise losing UI benefits) has a strongly encouraging effect on job 
search efforts. This is a type of ‘program-effect’ that has received little attention in the 
otherwise extensive literature on program evaluation in Sweden (see e.g. the recent sur-
vey by Calmfors et al, 2002).   
 The difference in the two countries’ replacement ratio profiles is clearly mirrored 
in the pattern of job transition rates. The ratio of transition rates for low- to high income 
workers is much smaller in Sweden than in Norway, reflecting that the ratio of replace-
ment ratios for low- to high income workers is much larger in Sweden than in Norway.  
When we use the between-countries variation in replacement ratios to identify causal ef-
fects, we also find that the effects associated with marginal changes in economic incen-
tives are larger in Norway (with a replacement ratio elasticity around –1.0) than in Swe-
den, (with an elasticity around –0.5). This may suggest that the ‘active’ labour market 
policies pursued in Sweden leave less scope for individuals to optimise freely with re-
spect to search intensity and reservation wages. 
 The potentially most important lesson arising from the empirical results presented 
in this paper is that it indeed seems to be possible to counteract the disincentive effects 
associated with a generous UI benefit system through a combination of ‘soft’ benefit du-
ration limits and active labour market policies. 
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